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ABSTRACT
Audio processing models based on deep neural networks are sus-
ceptible to adversarial attacks even when the adversarial audio
waveform is 99.9% similar to a benign sample. Given thewide range
of applications of DNN-based audio recognition systems from auto-
motives to virtual assistants, detecting the presence of adversarial
examples is of high practical relevance. We propose a method to
detect audio adversarial samples. Employing anomalous pattern
detection techniques in the activation space of these models, we
show that 2 of the recent and current state-of-the-art adversarial
attacks on audio processing systems systematically lead to higher-
than-expected activation at some subset of nodes and we can de-
tect these with up to an AUC of 0.98 with no degradation in per-
formance on benign samples. Furthermore, our work strengthens
the study of properties of adversarial examples that hold across
multiple domains.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→Machine learning; • Security
and privacy→ Software and application security.
KEYWORDS
Adversarial machine learning, automatic speech recognition, sub-
set scanning, neural network activation analysis
1 INTRODUCTION
Speech-based interaction is widely used in virtual personal assis-
tants (e.g. Siri, Google Assistant) and also moving to more criti-
cal areas such as virtual assistants for physicians (e.g. Saykara).
Given the increasing application of deep neural network-based au-
dio processing systems, the robustness of these systems is of high
relevance. Neural networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks
where an adversarial example [30] typically crafted by adding small
perturbations to the inputs causes an erroneous output that may be
prespecified by the adversary [6]. Existing work on adversarial ex-
amples focuses predominantly on image processing tasks [1] and
recently more attention is being given to other domains such as
audio for automatic speech recognition (ASR) [2, 7, 14, 14, 25, 31].
Thus, the detection of adversarial attacks is a key component in
building robust models.
Given an input audio waveform x , an ASR system f (.), and a
target transcription y, most attacks seek to find a small perturba-
tion δ such that x ′ = x + δ and f (x ′) = y though f (x) , y. This
is referred to as a targeted attack and such an adversarial audio
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waveform may be 99.9% similar to a benign sample [7]. Also, re-
cent work [25, 27, 32] has demonstrated the feasibility of these
adversarial samples being played over-the-air by simulating room
impulse responses and making them robust to reverberations. We
observe that the key differentiation between generating adversar-
ial examples across different tasks or input modalities such as im-
ages, audio or text lies in a change of architecture as these attacks
generally attempt to maximize the training loss and it is valuable
to study properties of adversarial examples that hold across mul-
tiple domains. Whereas existing work in defending against audio
adversarial attacks in propose preprocessing the audio waveform
as a means of defense [11, 26, 29, 33], our work treats the problem
as anomalous pattern detection and operates in an unsupervised
manner without apriori knowledge of the attack or labeled exam-
ples. We also do not rely on training data augmentation or spe-
cialized training techniques and can be complementary to existing
preprocessing techniques.
We claim two novel contributions of this work. First, we propose
a detection mechanism by using nonparametric scan statistics, ef-
ficiently optimized over node-activations to quantify the anoma-
lousness of such inputs into a real-valued “score”. Second, we show
empirical results across two state-of-the-art audio adversarial at-
tacks [7, 25] with consistent performance comparable to the cur-
rent state-of-the-art without losing accuracy of benign samples
which is a known downside of preprocessing approaches.
2 RELATED WORK
The property of deep neural networks being susceptible to adver-
sarial attack was largely established in [5] and [30]. Since then, nu-
merous kinds of attacks have been designed across multiple data
modalities including images [6, 15, 24] and audio [2, 7, 10, 14, 25].
A common kind of attack is an evasion attack [8] where the adver-
sary with no influence over the training of the model attempts to
evade the system during inference by crafting malicous samples.
Early work on audio adversarial research focused on untargeted
attackswhere the goal is to produce an incorrect but arbitrary tran-
scription for an ASR given an input that has been minimally per-
turbed. In [10], a multi-modal attack is introduced that proposes
the use of a differentiable surrogate loss function in place of the
task loss, and applied to speech recognition (with phonetic con-
straints). However, targeted attacks were notably difficult. In [7],
an iterative optimization targeted attack is introduced with 100%
success rate on state-of-the-art audio models with the limitation
being the inability of these samples to remain adversarial when
played over-the-air. In [25], this limitation is addressed by leverag-
ing psychoacoustics towards more imperceptible and over-the-air
attacks.
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On the other hand, defending against audio adversarial attacks
has predominantly focused on preprocessing techniques such as
mp3 compression, quantization, adding noise, or smoothing [11,
26, 29, 33]. However, these approaches modify the input in some
way and affect performance on benign samples. Particularly, [33]
propose using the explicit temporal dependency in audio e.g. cor-
relations in consecutive waveform segments and show that it is
affected by adversarial perturbations. However, there exists an in-
ductive bias in form of what time step(s) to break up the waveform
sequence for it to be evaluated as being adversarial while minimiz-
ing the performance degradation if the sample is benign. Also, for
an audio sample to be deleterious, in the real world, only a small
subset of the transcription given a waveform sequence needs to
be adversarially targeted. For example, a sample that translates to
- “Alexa, please call the doctor” and changed to “Alexa, please call
the doorman” using a combination attack may have a low Word
Error Rate in the face of Temporal Dependency. A different ap-
proach to detecting adversarial samples is to leverage the uncer-
tainty estimates of a trained model under different dropout config-
urations [13]. In [17], they extend this defense to an ASR model
with strong performance but only evaluate with a simple model
whereas the current state-of-the-art attack is applied to more com-
plex sequence-sequence basedmodelswhere naive dropout is known
to significantly affect performance [3].
This motivates the need to explore other mechanisms for ad-
versarial audio detection. Our work shows strong discriminative
power against adversarial samples without preprocessing the in-
put thus preventing performance degradation on clean samples
and we apply our defense to a sequence-sequence based model
with attention, Lingvo ASR system [28] with competitive results.
3 NON-PARAMETRIC SCAN STATISITCS AND
SUBSET SCANNING
Subset scanning (SS) is an approach to pattern detection, which
treats the problem as a search for the “most anomalous” subset of
observations in the data. Herein, anomalousness is quantified by a
scoring function, F (S). We formulate the audio adversarial detec-
tion problem as being able to efficiently identify S∗ = argmaxS F (S)
over all relevant subsets of node activations within an ASR that is
processing audio waveforms at runtime. We use non-parametric
scan statistics (NPSS) that have been used in other pattern detec-
tion methods [9, 19, 20, 22] as our scoring function.
Let there be M clean audio samples Xz included in DH0 . These
samples generate activations AH0zj at each node Oj . Let Xi (not in
DH0 ) be a test sample under evaluation. This audio sample creates
activations Ai j at each node Oj in the network. The p-value, pi j ,
is the proportion of background activations AH0zj greater than the
activation induced by the test sample Ai j at node Oj . We convert
the test sample Xi to a vector of p-values pi j of length J = |O |.
The key assumption is that under the alternative hypothesis of
an anomaly present in the activation data, then at least some subset
of the activations SO ⊆ O will systematically appear extreme. We
now turn to non-parametric scan statistics to identify and quantify
this set of p-values.
The general form of the NPSS score function is
F (S) = max
α
Fα (S) = max
α
ϕ(α ,Nα (S),N (S)), (1)
whereN (S) represents the number of empirical p-values contained
in subset S and Nα (S) is the number of p-values less than (signifi-
cance level) α contained in subset S . There are well-known NPSS
that can be utilized [19] such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [18]
or Higher-Criticism [12]. In this work, we use the Berk-Jones test
statistic [4] ϕBJ .
ϕBJ (α ,Nα ,N ) = N ∗ KL
(
Nα
N
,α
)
, (2)
where KL is the Kullback-Liebler divergence KL(x,y) = x log xy +
(1− x) log 1−x1−y between the observed and expected proportions of
significant p-values. Berk-Jones is a log-likelihood ratio for testing
whether the p-values are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] as com-
pared to a piece-wise constant alternative distribution, and has
been shown to fulfill several optimality properties.
3.1 Efficient Maximization of NPSS
Although NPSS provides a means to evaluate the anomalousness
of a subset of node activations SO discovering which of the 2
J pos-
sible subsets provides the most evidence of an anomalous pattern
is computationally infeasible for moderately sized data sets. How-
ever, NPSS has been shown to satisfy the linear-time subset scan-
ning (LTSS) property [21], which allows for an efficient and exact
maximization over subsets of data.
The LTSS property uses a priority functionG(Oj ) to rank nodes
and then proves that the highest-scoring subset consists of the “top-
k” priority nodes for some k in 1 . . . J . The priority of a node for
NPSS is the proportion of p-values that are less than α . However,
because we are scoring a single audio sample and there is only one
p-value at each node, the priority of a node is either 1 (when the
p-value is less than α ) or 0 (otherwise). Therefore, for a fixed, given
α threshold, the most anomalous subset is all and only nodes with
p-values less than α . We refer to this α threshold as αmax .
To maximize the scoring function over αmax , let S(k) be the sub-
set containing the k nodes with the smallestp-values and αk be the
largest p-value among these k nodes. The LTSS property guaran-
tees that the highest-scoring subset (for the chosen αmax ) will be
one of these J subsets S(1), S(2), . . . S(J ) with their corresponding
αk threshold. Any subset of nodes that does not take this form
(or uses an alternate αk ) is provably sub-optimal and not consid-
ered. Critically, this drastically reduced search space still guaran-
tees identifying the highest-scoring subset of nodes for a test audio
sample under evaluation. Pseudo-code for subset scanning over ac-
tivations for audio samples can be found in Algorithm 1.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we introduce the datasets, target models, and at-
tack types evaluated in our proposed approach.We describe the ex-
perimental setup for three experiments: DeepSpeech model evalu-
ated with Common Voice dataset, DeepSpeech evaluated with Lib-
rispeech dataset and Lingvo evaluated with Librispeech. We sum-
marize our results in Table 1 and compare with the current state-
of-the-art detection methods.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for subset scanning over activations of
individual audio samples. For a given audio sample, we compute
an anomalousnes score F (S∗) that characterizes how extreme the
node-activations for that sample is compared to a background dis-
tribution. We also return the subset of nodes S∗ and alpha α∗ that
maximize the score.
Input: Background samples: Xz ∈ DH0 , Evaluation sample: Xi ,
αmax.M = |DH0 |.
ASR ← TrainNetwork (training dataset)
ASRy ← Some flattened layer of ASR
for z ← 0 toM do
for j ← 0 to J do
A
H0
zj ← ExtractActivation (ASRy , Xz )
end
end
for j ← 0 to J do
Ai j ← ExtractActivation (ASRy , Xi )
end
pi j =
∑
Xz ∈D
H0 I (Azj>=Ai j )+1
M+1
p∗i j = {y < αmax ∀ y ⊆ pi j }
psi j ← SortAscending (pi j )
for k ← 1 to J do
S(k) = {py ⊆ p
s
i j∀y ∈ {1, . . . ,k}}
αk =max(S(k))
F (S(k)) ← NPSS (αk , k, k)
end
k∗ ← argmax F (S(k))
α∗ = αk∗
S∗ = S(k∗)
return S∗, α∗, and F (S∗)
4.1 Datasets
Mozilla CommonVoice dataset:CommonVoice is an audio dataset
provided by Mozilla. This dataset is public and contains samples
from voice recordings of humans. We resample the subset used in
our experiments to 16Khz with an average duration of 3.9 seconds.
Dataset LibriSpeech dataset: LibriSpeech [23] is a corpus of ap-
proximately 1000 hours of 16Khz English speech derived from au-
diobooks from the LibriVox project. Samples in our subset have an
average duration of 4.3 seconds.
4.2 Target Models and Attacks
DeepSpeech: We apply CW attack [7] on version 0.4.1 of Deep-
Speech [16]. To generate adversarial examples on ASR systems [7]
use the typical adversarial example generation algorithm that solves
Eq. 3. Particularly, they set ℓ to the CTC-loss and use themax-norm
which has the effect of adding a small amount of adversarial per-
turbation consistently throughout the audio sample.
min ℓ(f (x + δ ),y) + α · ‖δ ‖
such that ‖δ ‖ < ϵ
(3)
We set the number of iterations to 100 with a learning rate of
100 and generate adversarial examples for Mozilla Common Voice
(the first 100 test instances) and Librispeech (the first 200 test-clean
instances) with a success rate of 92% and 94.5% respectively.
Lingvo: [25] proposed a new attack (IA) improving the CW at-
tack leveraging frequency masking by enforcing the power spec-
tral density pδ of the perturbation in the short-time Fourier trans-
form (STFT) domain to be under a frequency masking threshold
θx of the original audio sample by optimizing the following:
min ℓ(f (x + δ ),y) + α
⌊ N2 ⌋∑
k=0
max{pδ (k) − θx (k), 0}, (4)
where α controls the relative importance of the term making the
perturbation imperceptible, and N is the STFT window size. The
attack is a 2 stage process whereby α = 0 during the optimization
to find a perturbed sample transcribing as target y, and α is slowly
increased to satisfy the imperceptibility constraint by fine-tuning
the perturbation in the second stage. We apply IA attack on the
Lingvo system [28] with a stage 1 learning rate of 100 with 1000
iterations and a stage 2 learning rate of 0.1 with 4000 iterations. We
generate adversarial examples for Librispeech (the first 130 test-
clean instances) with a 100% success rate.
4.3 Experimental setup
For each of our experiments, we extract the node activations, post
activation function. In this case, after the relu function (NPSS can
be applied on any activation function and architecture). We then
extract activations from clean audio samples that form our distribu-
tion of activations under a null hypothesis of no adversarial noise
present. Activations from samples in the evaluation set are com-
pared against the activations from the clean samples to create em-
pirical p-values for each sample. These p-values are scored by non-
parametric scan statistics to quantify the anomalousness of each
sample in the evaluation set (See Section 3). In other words, each
audio sample is quantified with an anomalousness score. We set
αmax to 0.5 for all experiments. Future supervised experiments
could tune αmax to increase detection further. Once we obtain an
anomalousness score for each sample, we evaluate the ability to
separate clean samples from adversarial samples using AUCwhich
is a threshold independent metric.
DeepSpeech experiment on CommonVoice:We draw the first
1000 samples from the trainset and choose the first 800 as our
background and remaining 200 as our clean samples. We randomly
draw 90 samples from the 92 adversarially generated examples as
our adversarial samples.
DeepSpeech experiment on Librispeech:, We draw the first
1000 samples from the test-clean set and choose the first 800 as our
background and remaining 200 as our clean samples. We randomly
draw 90 samples from the 189 adversarially generated examples as
our adversarial samples.
Lingvo experiment on Librispeech:We draw the 201-600 sam-
ples from the test-clean set and choose the first 300 as our back-
ground and remaining 100 as our clean samples. We randomly
draw 100 samples from the 130 adversarially generated examples
as our adversarial samples.
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Table 1: AUC across attacks and datasets. We show the back-
ground (Bg), clean (Cl), and adversarial (Ad) sample sizes for
eachModel (M), Data (D) and Attack (A) triplet. We compare
with current state-of-the-art detection methods Temporal
Dependency (TD) and Dropout Uncertainty (DU) which uses
accuracy (ACC) and show competitive detection across Lib-
riSpeech (LS) and common voice (CV) for the CW and IA at-
tacks on DeepSpeech (DS) and Lingvo (LV) models.
M, D, A,
(Bg, Cl, Ad)
Layers
dimensions
TD
(AUC)
DU
(ACC)
SS
(AUC)
DS, CV, CW 80, 2048 0.936 91.5 0.283
(800, 200, 90) 80, 2048 0.158
80, 4096 0.973
80, 2048 0.903
DS, LS, CW 64, 2048 0.930 NA 0.568
(800, 200, 90) 64, 2048 0.038
64, 4096 0.982
64, 2048 0.527
LV, LS, IA 179, 40, 32 NA NA 0.755
(300, 100, 100) 212, 20, 32 0.491
423, 40, 32 0.571
212, 20, 32 0.479
As the audio samples vary in length the outputs from the activa-
tion nodes also vary, we choose the minimum across all sets (back-
ground, clean and adversarial) and cut off the activations at this
length. Since both evaluated attacks perturb the entire audio wave-
formwe believe the adversarial patternwill still be detected.We ex-
periment with choosing different segments of the activation with
no significant variance to AUC.
We compare against the ASR results of Temporal dependency (TD)
[33], and Dropout Uncertainty (DU) [17] which is only applied to
DeepSpeech and evaluated using accuracy so we have no knowl-
edge of how false positives impact it’s performance.
5 RESULTS
We show the results of scanning over specific layers of both evalu-
ated models as well as the number of node activation for each layer
in Table 1. Subset scanning (SS) achieves AUC as high as 0.973 on
Common Voice and 0.982 on LibriSpeech with DeepSpeech (both
in the "relu_2" layer) and 0.755 on LibriSpeech with Lingvo
("fprop_enc_convl0_relu0" layer).We leave the exploration ofwhat
layers provide the most discriminative potential for future work.
These results show that subset scanning is indeed an effectivemethod
for detecting adversarial audio attacks. Given these results, we think
that studying properties of adversarial examples that hold across
multiple domains presents an interesting research direction.
6 DISCUSSION
An adversary with knowledge of the scoring function and αmax
may be able to craft an attackwith a loss function that optimizes an
objective such that the node-activation p-values are uniformly dis-
tributed when compared to a background distribution while min-
imizing the perturbation to the sample. We briefly discuss the com-
plexities of being able to achieve this. The attack should bemarginally
better than the CW attack as such, assuming the vanilla CW attack
is enhanced with the addition of terms to defeat subset scanning
the following would be required. First it should optimize across all
the layers L of the model, and secondly it should account for all
J subsets that the LTSS property guarantees the highest-scoring
subset will be present in. The attack could also attempt to use a sur-
rogate loss function as was proposed in [10] for non-differentiable
and combinatorial loss functions, but we note that successful tar-
geted attack was not achieved. Nonetheless, a simple but naive op-
timization can be formulated as in equation (5).
Assuming this converges, it will take an enormous amount of
time particularly if imperceptibility is desired (the IA attack takes
10hrs for a single sample on average on a machine with two Tesla
K80GPUs and 512Gb of RAM). In addition, recall thatwe setαmax =
0.5.We could also randomly chooseαmax within a range that guar-
antees high detection on a class of attacks and further force an
adaptive adversary to consider all possible values of αmax .
min ℓ(f (x + δ ),y) + α · ‖δ ‖ +
|L |∑
l=0
(
| J |∑
j=0
(SS(x) − SS((x + δ )))
such that ‖δ ‖ < ϵ
(5)
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed an unsupervised method for adversar-
ial audio attack detection with subset scanning. Our method can
detect multiple state-of-the-art adversarial attacks across multiple
datasets. This discriminative potential comes from the idea that ad-
versarially noised samples produce anomalous activations in neu-
ral networks that are detectable by efficiently searching over sub-
sets of these activations.Whereas existing work in defending against
audio adversarial attack proposes preprocessing the audio wave-
form as ameans of defense, we treat the problem as anomalous pat-
tern detection without apriori knowledge of the attack or labeled
examples. We also do not rely on training data augmentation or
specialized training techniques and can be complementary to ex-
isting preprocessing techniques. We note that an adversary may be
able to use the knowledge of the technique to create an adaptive
attack and discuss the challenges to achieving this. Future work
will focus on leveraging the information contained in which sub-
set of nodes optimized the scoring function for that sample. This
could lead towards new methods of neural network visualizations
and explainability.
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